.} \textbf{58} (1991) 121-128] are two fundamental papers on two-agent Nash implementation. Both of them are based on Maskin … algorithmic mechanism. In this paper, we will investigate two-agent Nash implementation by virtue of the algorithmic mechanism …. The main result is: The sufficient and necessary conditions for Nash implementation with two agents shall be amended, not …

characterization of Nash implementation with partially-honest individuals. It also provides the necessary and sufficient condition for … Nash implementation with partially-honest individuals by mechanisms with some types of strategy-space reductions. As a … consequence, it shows that, in contrast to the case of the standard framework, the equivalence between Nash implementation and …

Mechanism design, a reverse problem of game theory, is an important branch of economics. Nash implementation is the … conditions for Nash implementation are amended not only in the quantum world, but also in the real world. … cornerstone of the theory of mechanism design. The well-known Maskin's theorem describes the sufficient conditions for Nash …

Noting that a full characterization of Nash-implementation is given using a canonical-mechanism and Maskin’s theorem …

communication complexity (measured in bits or real numbers) of Nash implementation of social choice rules. A key distinction is … total message space size needed for one-stage Nash implementation is essentially the same as that needed for "verification … envy-free allocations) we propose a two-stage Nash implementation mechanism in which each agent announces no more than two …

The paper considers the communication complexity (measured in bits or real numbers) of Nash implementation of social … "intersection monotonic" -- the total message space size needed for one-stage Nash implementation is essentially the same as that …, and envy-free allocations) we propose a two-stage Nash implementation mechanism in which each agent announces no more than …