We prove the existence of a trembling-hand perfect equilibrium within a class of compact, metric, and possibly discontinuous games. Our conditions for existence are easily verified in a variety of economic games.

In this paper we apply the Complete Analysis of Differentiable Games [introduced by D. Carfì in (Carfi 2010), (Carfi 2009), (Carfi 2009), and (Carfi 2009)] and already employed by himself and others in (Carfi 2011), (Carfi 2010), (Carfi 2009)] to the classic Bertrand Duopoly (1883), classic...

We prove the existence of a trembling-hand perfect equilibrium within a class of compact, metric, and possibly discontinuous games. Our conditions for existence are easily verified in a variety of economic games.

In this paper we apply the Complete Analysis of Differentiable Games (introduced by D. Carfì in [3], [6], [8] and [9]) and al-ready employed by himself and others in [4], [5], [7]) to the classic Bertrand Duopoly (1883), classic oligopolistic market in which there are two enterprises producing...

In the present work we propose an original analytical model of coopetitive games. We try to apply this analytical model of coopetition - based on Game Theory and conceived at a macro level - to the Greek crisis, suggesting feasible solutions in a cooperative perspective for the divergent...

I analyze the effects of memory limitations on the endogenous learning behavior of an agent in a standard two-armed bandit problem. An infinitely lived agent chooses each period between two alternatives with unknown types, to maximize discounted payoffs. The agent can experiment with each...

In certain situations, syntactically valid, but incorrect, data entered into a database can result in near-immediate, catastrophic financial losses for an organization. Examples include: omitting zeros in prices of goods on e-commerce sites; and financial fraud where data is directly entered...