The problem of the existence of Berge equilibria in the sense of Zhukovskii in normal-form finite games in pure and in mixed strategies is studied. The example of a three-player game that has Berge equilibrium neither in pure, nor in mixed strategies is given.

Deviations from equilibrium predictions in one-shot games are common in experiments, and various models have been proposed to capture the behavior of boundedlyrational players in games. While the Quantal Response Equilibrium model allows players to better respond to correct beliefs, in the model...

Chapter 1. Operations Management: A Curtain Raiser -- Chapter 2. Game Theory: Primitives and Representations -- Chapter 3. Games in Normal Form -- Chapter 4. Games in Normal Form: Applications in OM -- Chapter 5. Games in Extensive Form -- Chapter 6. Games in Extensive Form: Applications in OM...