extends the agency cost-padding model by Laffont and Tirole (1992) to allow for the principal to be a partially selfish … strict auditing, deters the contracting firm from padding costs; conversely, a selfish politician chooses a relatively lax … auditing in order to create an incentive for cost-padding, and engages in corruption with the firm in case of detection. If the …

improve their on-time performance ranking by resorting to unscrupulous means such as padding their schedules beyond normal … schedule padding. We construct a measure for schedule padding under different optimal flight time choices. Using different … measures of market structure, we find that more competitive (concentrated) markets are subject to less (more) schedule padding.  …

politician, by choosing a sufficiently strict auditing, deters the contracting firm from padding costs, conversely, a selfish … politician chooses a relatively lax auditing in order to create an incentive for cost-padding, and engages in corruption with the … firm in case of detection. If the cost of auditing is high enough, even a benevolent politician might prefer to allow cost-padding. …

politician, by choosing a sufficiently strict auditing, deters the contracting firm from padding costs, conversely, a selfish … politician chooses a relatively lax auditing in order to create an incentive for cost-padding, and engages in corruption with the … firm in case of detection. If the cost of auditing is high enough, even a benevolent politician might prefer to allow cost-padding. …