This paper presents the results of two experimental evaluations of transitional jobs programs for recently released former prisoners: the Evaluation of the Center for Employment Opportunities (CEO) and the Transitional Jobs Reentry Demonstration (TJRD). The analysis assesses the effects of these...

This paper presents the results of two experimental evaluations of transitional jobs programs for recently released former prisoners: the Evaluation of the Center for Employment Opportunities (CEO) and the Transitional Jobs Reentry Demonstration (TJRD). The analysis assesses the effects of these...

This paper considers the problem of allocating N indivisible objects among N agents according to their preferences when transfers are not allowed, and studies the tradeoff between fairness and efficiency in the class of strategy-proof mechanisms. The main finding is that for strategy-proof...

This paper studies the problem of assigning a set of indivisible objects to a set of agents when monetary transfers are not allowed and agents reveal only ordinal preferences, but random assignments are possible. We offer two characterizations of the probabilistic serial mechanism, which assigns...

This paper studies the problem of assigning a set of indivisible objects to a set of agents when monetary transfers are not allowed and agents reveal only ordinal preferences, but random assignments are possible. We offer two characterizations of the probabilistic serial mechanism, which assigns...

This paper considers the problem of allocating N indivisible objects among N agents according to their preferences when transfers are not allowed, and studies the tradeoff between fairness and efficiency in the class of strategy-proof mechanisms. The main finding is that for strategy-proof...