We investigate labor exchange teams in rural communities, which are prevalent in many developing countries. We show theoretically that these teams are beneficial to employers, who can outsource the monitoring of workers. Team members are incentivized to exert a high level of effort because any...

We investigate labor exchange teams in rural communities, which are prevalent in many developing countries. We show theoretically that these teams are beneficial to employers, who can outsource the monitoring of workers. Team members are incentivized to exert high effort because any deviation...

We investigate labor exchange teams in rural communities, which are prevalent in many developing countries. We show theoretically that these teams are beneficial to employers, who can outsource the monitoring of workers. Team members are incentivized to exert a high level of effort because any...

We investigate labor exchange teams in rural communities, which are prevalent in many developing countries. We show theoretically that these teams are beneficial to employers, who can outsource the monitoring of workers. Team members are incentivized to exert high effort because any deviation...

Many business relationships begin with informal interactions and later transition to formal contracts. Using a repeated-games model with a finite horizon, we show that this hybrid-contracting approach can both prolong cooperation (intensive margin) and enable it across a broader range of...

Many business relationships begin with informal interactions and later transition to formal contracts. Using a repeated-games model with a finite horizon, we show that this hybrid-contracting approach can both prolong cooperation (intensive margin) and enable it across a broader range of...