From an employer's perspective a tournament should induce agents to exert productive activities but refrain from destructive ones. We experimentally test the predictive power of a tournament model which suggests that - within a reasonable framework - productive and destructive activities are not...

Tournament incentive schemes offer payments dependent on relative performance and thereby are intended to motivate agents to exert productive effort. Unfortunately, however, an agent may also be tempted to destroy the production of his competitors in order to improve the own relative position....

This paper focuses on the delegation of bank managers of lending decisions to their agents typically subordinate employees of the bank. We assume that agents may base their decisions about lending to borrowers on decisions other banks have made about these same borrowers. Then we show that there...

This paper proposes a model in which economic relations and institutions in advanced and less-developed economies differ as these societies have access to different amounts of information. This lack of information makes it hard to give the right incentives to managers and entrepreneurs. We argue...