of Pareto-efficient rules, it is known that top trading cycles (TTC) is the only rule that is strategy-proof and …-efficient rules, we find that TTC is still the only rule that is strategy-proof and individually rational. Our characterization result …

model. The authority announces a strategy-proof mechanism and then privately selects a mechanism to initiate a matching. An …) implies commitment to stability. Finally, I show that group strategy-proof and efficient announcements allow commitment to …

of Pareto-efficient rules, it is known that top trading cycles (TTC) is the only rule that is strategy-proof and …-efficient rules, we find that TTC is still the only rule that is strategy-proof and individually rational. Our characterization result …

model. The authority announces a strategy-proof mechanism and then privately selects a mechanism to initiate a matching. An …) implies commitment to stability. Finally, I show that group strategy-proof and efficient announcements allow commitment to …

alternatives -- Arrovian aggregation and strategy-proof social choice -- Condorcet domains of weak and partial orders. …

Despite the truthful dominant strategy, participants in strategy-proof me- chanisms submit manipulated preferences. In …

Despite the truthful dominant strategy, participants in strategy-proof me- chanisms submit manipulated preferences. In …