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  • Search: subject:"Value Design"
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Year of publication
Subject
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Mechanism Design 7 Value Design 7 Differentiation 6 Mechanism design 4 Mechanismus-Design-Theorie 4 Product design 4 Produktgestaltung 4 Auction theory 3 Auktionstheorie 3 Architecture 1 Betriebliche Wertschöpfung 1 Business model 1 Di!erentiation 1 Geschäftsmodell 1 Internet der Dinge 1 Internet of things 1 Machine-to-machine 1 Modularisierung 1 Modularity 1 Value creation 1 Value design 1
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Online availability
All
Free 7 CC license 1 Undetermined 1
Type of publication
All
Book / Working Paper 7 Article 1
Type of publication (narrower categories)
All
Working Paper 7 Arbeitspapier 4 Graue Literatur 3 Non-commercial literature 3 Article in journal 1 Aufsatz in Zeitschrift 1
Language
All
English 8
Author
All
Nava, Francesco 7 Prummer, Anja 7 Leminen, Seppo 1 Rajahonka, Mervi 1 Wendelin, Robert 1 Westerlund, Mika 1
Published in...
All
Discussion paper 3 Discussion Paper 2 Industrial marketing management : the international journal for industrial and high-tech firms 1 Working Paper 1 Working paper / Department of Economics, Johannes-Kepler-Universität of Linz 1
Source
All
ECONIS (ZBW) 5 EconStor 3
Showing 1 - 8 of 8
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Divisive by design shaping values in optimal mechanisms
Prummer, Anja; Nava, Francesco - 2026
We study a principal who allocates a good to agents with private, independently distributed values through an optimal mechanism. The principal can strategically shape these value distributions by modifying the good's features, which affect agents' valuations. Our analysis reveals that optimal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015614568
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Divisive by design shaping values in optimal mechanisms
Prummer, Anja; Nava, Francesco - 2026 - 2., überarbeitete Auflage
We study a principal who allocates a good to agents with private, independently distributed values through an optimal mechanism. The principal can strategically shape these value distributions by modifying the good's features, which affect agents' valuations. Our analysis reveals that optimal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015609713
Saved in:
Cover Image
Divisive by design : shaping values in optimal mechanisms
Prummer, Anja; Nava, Francesco - 2025
We study a principal who allocates a good to agents with private, independently distributed values through an optimal mechanism. The principal can strategically shape these value distributions by modifying the good's features, which affect agents' valuations. Our analysis reveals that optimal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015431553
Saved in:
Cover Image
Divisive by design shaping values In optimal mechanisms
Prummer, Anja; Nava, Francesco - 2025
We study a principal who allocates a good to agents with private, independently distributed values through an optimal mechanism. The principal can strategically shape these value distributions by modifying the good's features, which affect agents' valuations. Our analysis reveals that optimal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015432097
Saved in:
Cover Image
Divisive by design shaping values In optimal mechanisms
Prummer, Anja; Nava, Francesco - 2025
We study a principal who allocates a good to agents with private, independently distributed values through an optimal mechanism. The principal can strategically shape these value distributions by modifying the good's features, which affect agents' valuations. Our analysis reveals that optimal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015436017
Saved in:
Cover Image
Value design in optimal mechanisms
Prummer, Anja; Nava, Francesco - 2023
A principal allocates a single good to one of several agents whose values are privately and independently distributed, employing an optimal mechanism. The principal shapes the distribution of the agents' values within general classes of constraints. Divisive product designs, which are either...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014309342
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Cover Image
Value design in optimal mechanisms
Prummer, Anja; Nava, Francesco - 2023
A principal allocates a single good to one of several agents whose values are privately and independently distributed, employing an optimal mechanism. The principal shapes the distribution of the agents' values within general classes of constraints. Divisive product designs, which are either...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014374663
Saved in:
Cover Image
Industrial Internet of Things business models in the machine-to-machine context
Leminen, Seppo; Rajahonka, Mervi; Wendelin, Robert; … - In: Industrial marketing management : the international … 84 (2020), pp. 298-311
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012162597
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