We develop an organizational governance model with a single buyer and endogenous upstream entry. Investments and control rights over assets and actions are immediately contractable; production is contractable after uncertainty resolves. We show the following: Supplier competition eliminates...

We conduct an artefactual field experiment in real-existing trade networks to analyze how individual network degree affects bargaining demands and outcomes. We combine data from a bilateral bargaining experiment with data of trade networks in 24 villages in Uganda. To identify the effect of...

Negotiation outcomes are commonly analyzed through equilibrium concepts, yet many agreements fail during implementation for reasons not captured by incentive structure alone This paper introduces a pre-equilibrium screening criterion for bargaining fragility based on a small set of...

Schelling (1956) first clarified how power to reduce one’s freedom of choice might benefit a bargaining party. A commitment to reject proposals, when successful, may force concessions from opponents who otherwise might have an upper hand. This paper experimentally studies credible commitments...

Migration brings strong economic benefits in the short term and even greater long-term benefits as it contributes to innovation, investment and economic dynamism. The costs of additional migrants are borne by communities that feel pressure on local services, while the benefits are spread more...