The purpose of this paper is an analysis of the presence of self-selection mechanisms on the market that could bring the market closer to the separating equilibrium state, in line with the Rothschild-Stiglitz equilibrium model and its subsequent modifications. An example is the Polish market of...

Disability Insurance (DI) may affect workers' outcomes such as their probability to enter DI, to recover, and their employment. Supplementary insurance may increase these moral hazard effects, but also increases the financial gains of private insurers to reduce benefit costs. With increased...

A general problem in insurance economics is to establish how insurance demand is affected by the size of the loss suffered in the previous period. This problem lays out the underlying objective of this study, which examines how insurance demand changes post-catastrophes, and how it can be...

We examine a problem of demand for insurance indemnification, when the insured is sensitive to ambiguity and behaves according to the Maxmin-Expected Utility model of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), whereas the insurer is a (risk-averse or risk-neutral) Expected-Utility maximizer. We characterize...

We analyze optimal insurance design for a risk- and ambiguity-averse policyholder who is uncertain about the distribution of losses and faces linear transaction costs. We use smooth ambiguity preferences, a flexible ambiguity structure, and focus on indemnity schedules that satisfy the principle...