In markets with budget-constrained buyers, competitive equilibria need not be efficient in the utilitarian sense, or maximise the seller's revenue. We consider a setting with multiple divisible goods. Competitive equilibrium outcomes, and only those, are constrained utilitarian efficient, a...

When faced with budget-constrained bidders, all-pay auctions revenue-dominate standard auctions (Örst and second-price), which, in a competitive market, gives an edge to the all-pay format. An equilibrium in which sellers compete with standard auctions fails to exist if the all-pay format is...

We propose an easy-to-use method for estimating preference parameters experimentally: choices from strictly concave budget restrictions (SCBRs). SCBRs generalize the popular method of analyzing choices from linear budget restrictions (LBRs). SCBRs promise (i) to improve the informational content...

When faced with budget-constrained bidders, all-pay auctions revenue-dominate standard auctions (Örst and second-price), which, in a competitive market, gives an edge to the all-pay format. An equilibrium in which sellers compete with standard auctions fails to exist if the all-pay format is...

We propose an easy-to-use method for estimating preference parameters experimentally: choices from strictly concave budget restrictions (SCBRs). SCBRs generalize the popular method of analyzing choices from linear budget restrictions (LBRs). SCBRs promise (i) to improve the informational content...