In a labor market model with cheap talk, employers can send messages about their willingness to pay for higher … had their signal revealed to job-seekers. In response to revelation of the cheap talk signal, job-seekers targeted their … wage. The treatment increased measures of match quality through better sorting, illustrating the power of cheap talk for …

In a labor market model with cheap talk, employers can send messages about their willingness to pay for higher … signal revealed to job-seekers. In response to revelation of the cheap talk signal, job-seekers targeted their applications …. The treatment increased measures of match quality through better sorting, illustrating the power of cheap talk for talent …

In a labor market model with cheap talk, employers can send messages about their willingness to pay for higher … had their signal revealed to job-seekers. In response to revelation of the cheap talk signal, job-seekers targeted their … wage. The treatment increased measures of match quality through better sorting, illustrating the power of cheap talk for …

In a labor market model with cheap talk, employers can send messages about their willingness to pay for higher … signal revealed to job-seekers. In response to revelation of the cheap talk signal, job-seekers targeted their applications …. The treatment increased measures of match quality through better sorting, illustrating the power of cheap talk for talent …

-binding price requests. Using a laboratory experiment, we examine how competition moderates the way such cheap-talk communication … granularity effects of cheap-talk communication on negotiation outcomes. Our results show that most of these effects survive with …