We reappraise the Arrow problem by studying the aggregation of choice functions. We do so in the general framework of judgment aggregation, in which choice functions are naturally representable by specifying, for each menu A and each alternative x in A, whether x is choosable from A, or not. Our...

This article reexamines the contexts in which Arrow's Social Choice and Individual Values (1951) emerged, clarifying the often acknowledged yet unexplained influence of Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. It situates Arrow's work within his training in logic and statistics in 1940s New York...

In a strategy-proof mechanism, implementation theory mostly assumes that each agent is rational in the sense that the agent reveals its true preference to induce its most preferred outcome. This assumption is sufficient to guarantee that the agent seeks such an outcome, but not necessary because...

Why do some individuals evade taxes while others do not? We study this question using administrative tax records from Uruguay linked to a tailored survey of taxpayers. Using third-party reports, we measure individual income under-reporting as an indicator of evasion. We then examine how three...

This paper provides the first evidence that children's economic preferences vary systematically with parental mental health. Using experimentally elicited measures of economic preferences from more than 4,500 children in Bangladesh, we document that children of parents with indications of mental...

The current report presents findings of a research project that explored attitudes towards welfare and redistributive policies among Irish residents. Public support for the welfare state is an important foundation for democratic governments to pursue the policies needed to alleviate poverty in...