We develop a nonparametric and ordinal approach for testing pure strategy Nash equilibrium play in games with monotone best responses, such as those with strategic complements/substitutes. The approach makes minimal assumptions on unobserved heterogeneity, requires no parametric assumptions on...

We develop a nonparametric and ordinal approach for testing pure strategy Nash equilibrium play in games with monotone best responses, such as those with strategic complements/substitutes. The approach makes minimal assumptions on unobserved heterogeneity, requires no parametric assumptions on...

This paper revisits the n-player rent-seeking contest with homogeneous valuations and increasing returns. Our main result says that, for any m ∈ {2, . . . , n - 1}, there are threshold values 1 R∗(m) R∗ (m) È 2 for the Tullock parameter R such that a pure strategy equilibrium with m...

The purpose of this essay is to point out two errors which exist in Patinkin's Money, Interest and Prices. The aim is to show that the rehabilitation of the neoclassical theory of money and interest is not convincing. I shall try to show that Patinkin's refined version of the quantity theory...