We show that the Aumann-Davis-Maschler bargaining set and the Mas-Colell bargaining set of a non-leveled NTU game that is either ordinal convex or coalition merge convex coincides with the core of the game. Moreover, we show by means of an example that the foregoing statement may not be valid if...

We show that the Aumann-Davis-Maschler bargaining set and the Mas-Colell bargaining set of a non-leveled NTU game that is either ordinal convex or coalition merge convex coincides with the core of the game. Moreover, we show by means of an example that the foregoing statement may not be valid if...

The topic is two-fold. First, we prove the convexity of Owen's Airport Profit Game (inclusive of revenues and costs). As an adjunct, we characterize the class of 1-convex Airport Profit Games by equivalent properties of the corresponding cost function. Second, we classify the class of 1-convex...

An outcome of a game is partnered if there are no asymmetric dependencies between any two players. For a cooperative game, a payoff is in the partnered core of the game if it is partnered, feasible and cannot be improved upon by any coalition of players. We show that the relative interior of the...

Convex cooperative games were first introduced by Shapley (Int J Game Theory 1:11–26, <CitationRef CitationID="CR11">1971</CitationRef>) while population monotonic allocation schemes (PMAS) were subsequently proposed by Sprumont (Games Econ Behav 2:378–394, <CitationRef CitationID="CR13">1990</CitationRef>). In this paper we provide several characterizations of convex games and...</citationref></citationref>