We study the design of sequential procurement strategies that integrate stochastic and strategic information. We consider a buyer who repeatedly demands a certain good and is unable to commit to long-term contracts. In each time period, the buyer makes a price offer to a seller who has private,...

We explore the conditions under which the "first-order approach" (FO-approach) can be used to characterize profit maximizing contracts in dynamic principal-agent models. The FO-approach works when the resulting FO-optimal contract satisfies a particularly strong form of monotonicity in types, a...

Regulators and the firms they regulate interact repeatedly. Over the course of these interactions, the regulator collects data that contains information about the firm's id- iosyncratic private characteristics. This paper studies the case in which the regulator uses information gleaned from past...

Este trabajo analiza las implicaciones macroeconómicas de la acumulación de «capital de clientes» a nivel de empresa. Presentamos un modelo dinámico de búsqueda en el que distintas empresas compiten por los consumidores mediante la oferta de contratos de precios en el mercado de bienes. En...

We study the design of monitoring in dynamic settings with moral hazard. An agent (e.g. a firm) benefits from reputation for quality, and a principal (e.g. a regulator) can learn the agent's quality via costly inspections. Monitoring plays two roles: an incentive role, because outcomes of...

This article summarizes the Opportunity Zone incentive in the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act by providing descriptive statistics on the selected zones, outlining considerations for investors, and using data on the New Markets Tax Credit to inform expectations of investors' responses to this policy