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  • Search: subject:"falsification"
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Year of publication
Subject
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falsification 32 Falsification 25 costly state falsification 18 Theorie 16 Theory 14 adversarial 11 inquisitorial 11 procedure 10 preference falsification 9 Karl Popper 8 evidence production 8 Betrug 7 Fraud 7 Preference falsification 6 signalling 6 Identification 5 SOEP 5 advertising 5 data quality 5 China 4 Conflict 4 Experiment 4 Institutions 4 Kosten 4 Qualitative Analysis 4 Replication 4 interviewer falsification 4 Bayes-Statistik 3 Bayesian inference 3 Benford's Law 3 Chinese statistics 3 Confidence 3 Consumer behaviour 3 Data protection 3 Datenqualität 3 Datenschutz 3 Economic experiments 3 Entropy 3 Ethics 3 Evidence production 3
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Online availability
All
Free 60 Undetermined 48 CC license 1
Type of publication
All
Article 64 Book / Working Paper 62
Type of publication (narrower categories)
All
Article in journal 30 Aufsatz in Zeitschrift 30 Working Paper 20 Arbeitspapier 11 Graue Literatur 11 Non-commercial literature 11 research-article 3 Article 2 Aufsatz im Buch 2 Book section 2 Conference Paper 1 conceptual-paper 1 viewpoint 1
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Language
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English 73 Undetermined 49 German 1 French 1 Russian 1 Spanish 1
Author
All
Emons, Winand 17 Fluet, Claude 17 Lady, George M. 11 Buck, Andrew J. 9 Sarmiento, Roberto 5 Rubin, Jared 4 Schräpler, Jörg-Peter 4 Whelan, Garvan 4 Holz, Carsten A. 3 Karni, Edi 3 Perez-Richet, Eduardo 3 Schmidt, Klaus M. 3 Skreta, Basilikē 3 Beckmann, Elisabeth 2 Bredl, Sebastian 2 Buck, Andrew Jepherson 2 Deng, Feng 2 Funk, Patricia 2 Goldhaber, Dan 2 Hoover, Kevin D. 2 Kuhn, Michael 2 Menold, Natalja 2 Olbrich, Lukas 2 Picard, Pierre 2 Sakshaug, Joseph W. 2 Siciliani, Luigi 2 Spagat, Michael 2 Storfinger, Nina 2 Thurer, Matthias 2 Valenzuela-Stookey, Quitze 2 Vierø, Marie-Louise 2 Abizhanov, Syrym Maratovich 1 Armstrong, JS 1 Auerbach, Jan U. 1 Bardey, David 1 Barten, Anton P. 1 Betsch, Tilmann 1 Boehe, Dirk 1 Bouamama, Sadok 1 Bougheas, Spiros 1
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Institution
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C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 6 Economics Department, Temple University 6 Centre Interuniversitaire sur le Risque, les Politiques Économiques et l'Emploi (CIRPÉE) 4 Department Volkswirtschaftlehre, Universität Bern 4 Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München 3 EconWPA 2 Mathematica Policy Research 2 Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) 1 Centre d'Études Internationales de la Propriété Industrielle <Strasbourg> 1 Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra 1 Department of Economics, Towson University 1 Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung 1 Forschungsbasierte Infrastruktureinrichtung "Sozio-oekonomisches Panel (SOEP)", DIW Berlin (Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung) 1 HAL 1 Institut de Préparation à l'Administration et à la Gestion (IPAG) 1 MASTER CONSULTORES 1 Nationalekonomiska institutionen, Handelshögskolan 1 Ratioinstitutet 1 Verein für Socialpolitik - VfS 1 Zentrum für internationale Entwicklungs- und Umweltforschung (ZEU), Justus-Liebig-Universität Gießen 1
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Published in...
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CEPR Discussion Papers 6 DETU Working Papers 6 Cahiers de recherche 4 Diskussionsschriften 4 Discussion papers / CEPR 3 Econ Journal Watch 3 Discussion Papers 2 Economic Modelling 2 International journal of production research 2 Judgment and Decision Making 2 MPRA Paper 2 Marketing Science 2 Mathematica Policy Research Reports 2 SOEPpapers on Multidisciplinary Panel Data Research 2 Annual Conference 2011 (Frankfurt, Main): The Order of the World Economy - Lessons from the Crisis 1 Anuarul Universitatii „Petre Andrei” din Iasi / Year-Book „Petre Andrei” University from Iasi, Fascicula: Drept, Stiinte Economice, Stiinte Politice / Fascicle: Law, Economic Sciences, Political Sciences 1 BSE working paper : working papers 1 Basic research program working papers / Series: Economics / National Research University, Higher School of Economics 1 Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2011: Die Ordnung der Weltwirtschaft: Lektionen aus der Krise - Session: Advertising and Marketing Campaigns 1 Business history 1 CESifo Working Paper 1 CESifo working papers 1 CHOPE Working Paper 1 CHOPE working paper 1 China economic review : an international journal 1 Cross Cultural & Strategic Management 1 Cross cultural & strategic management 1 Defence and Peace Economics 1 Defence and peace economics 1 Discussion Paper 1 Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 1 Discussion Papers / Zentrum für internationale Entwicklungs- und Umweltforschung (ZEU), Justus-Liebig-Universität Gießen 1 Discussion papers / Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 1 Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society, an international society for the advancement of economic theory in its relation to statistics and mathematics 1 Econometrics 1 Econometrics : open access journal 1 Economic modelling 1 Economic theory : official journal of the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory 1 Economics Working Papers / Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra 1 European Journal of Law and Economics 1
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Source
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RePEc 62 ECONIS (ZBW) 45 EconStor 12 Other ZBW resources 6 ArchiDok 1
Showing 111 - 120 of 126
Cover Image
Adversarial versus Inquisitorial Testimony
Emons, Winand; Fluet, Claude - Department Volkswirtschaftlehre, Universität Bern - 2009
An arbiter can decide a case on the basis of his priors, or the two parties to the conflict may present further evidence. The parties may misrepresent evidence in their favor at a cost. At equilibrium the two parties never testify together. When the evidence is much in favor of one party, this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005049532
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Non-comparative versus Comparative Advertising as a Quality Signal
Emons, Winand; Fluet, Claude - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009
Two firms produce a product with a horizontal and a vertical characteristic. We call the vertical characteristic quality. The difference in the quality levels determines how the firms share the market. Firms know the quality levels, consumers do not. Under non-comparative advertising a firm may...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661761
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Cover Image
Adversarial versus Inquisitorial Testimony
Emons, Winand; Fluet, Claude - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009
An arbiter can decide a case on the basis of his priors, or the two parties to the conflict may present further evidence. The parties may misrepresent evidence in their favor at a cost. At equilibrium the two parties never testify together. When the evidence is much in favor of one party, this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008459770
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Cover Image
Methodological problems of economics as a nominalistic science
Hampl, Mojmír - In: Politická ekonomie 2000 (2000) 1
hypotheses testable by Popper's falsification method. Main purpose of the article is to describe and analyse some of the problems …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005258228
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Cover Image
Non-comparative versus Comparative Advertising as a Quality Signal
Emons, Winand; Fluet, Claude - Department Volkswirtschaftlehre, Universität Bern - 2008
Two firms produce a product with a horizontal and a vertical characteristic. We call the vertical characteristic quality. The difference in the quality levels determines how the firms share the market. Firms know the quality levels, consumers do not. Under non-comparative advertising a firm may...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005812724
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Cover Image
The role of cognitive and socio-cognitive conflict in learning to reason
Sacco, Katiuscia; Bucciarelli, Monica - In: Mind and Society: Cognitive Studies in Economics and … 7 (2008) 1, pp. 1-19
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005184751
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Upcoding and Optimal Auditing in Health Care (or The economics of DRG creep)
Kuhn, Michael; Siciliani, Luigi - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008
We present a model of optimal contracting between a purchaser and a provider of health services. We assume that providers can increase demand by increasing quality but can also inflate activity through a manipulative effort (upcoding or DRG creep). We derive and compare the optimal price and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661727
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Accuracy versus Falsification Costs: The Optimal Amount of Evidence under Different Procedures
Emons, Winand; Fluet, Claude - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007
An arbiter can decide a case on the basis of his priors or he can ask for further evidence from the two parties to the conflict. The parties may misrepresent evidence in their favour at a cost. The arbiter is concerned about accuracy and low procedural costs. When both parties testify, each of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504723
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Performance Indicators for Quality with Adverse Selection, Gaming and Inequality Aversion
Kuhn, Michael; Siciliani, Luigi - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007
Performance indicators are increasingly used to regulate quality in health care and other areas of the public sector. We develop a model of contracting between a purchaser (principal) and a provider (agent) under the following scenarios: a) higher ability increases quality directly and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123654
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Cover Image
Accuracy versus Falsification Costs: The optimal Amount of Evidence under different Procedures
Emons, Winand; Fluet, Claude - Department Volkswirtschaftlehre, Universität Bern - 2007
An arbiter can decide a case on the basis of his priors or he can ask for further evidence from the two parties to the conflict. The parties may misrepresent evidence in their favor at a cost. The arbiter is concerned about accuracy and low procedural costs. When both parties testify, each of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005212456
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