We study dynamic signaling in a game of stochastic stakes. Each period, a privately informed agent of binary type chooses whether to continue receiving a return that is an increasing function of both her reputation and an exogenous public stakes variable or to irreversibly exit the game. A...

We study dynamic signaling in a game of stochastic stakes. Each period, a privately informed agent of binary type chooses whether to continue receiving a return that is an increasing function of both her reputation and an exogenous public stakes variable or to irreversibly exit the game. A...

In this paper, we provide evidence of history-dependent stopping behavior. Using data from an online chess platform, we estimate a dynamic discrete choice model in which an agent may have time non-separable preferences over the stochastic outcomes of their actions. We show that the agent's...

In this paper, we provide evidence of history-dependent stopping behavior. Using data from an online chess platform, we estimate a dynamic discrete choice model in which an agent may have time non-separable preferences over the stochastic outcomes of their actions. We show that the agent’s...