A feature of many insurance markets is that they combine vertical differentiation (all consumers prefer high to low-coverage policies) and adverse selection (high cost customers prefer high-coverage plans). Building on Novshek and Sonnenschein (1978) and Azevedo and Gottlieb (2017), this paper...

Most of the previous research in the asymmetric information problem treats adverse selection and moral hazard separately, though they may coexist and interact with each other. We build a principal-agent model to examine optimal contracts in a competitive insurance market facing adverse selection...

This paper investigates Pareto optimal (PO, for short) insurance contracts in a behavioral finance framework, in which the insured evaluates contracts by the rank-dependent utility (RDU) theory and the insurer uses the expected value premium principle. The incentive compatibility constraint is...

This article studies insurance demand in a two-period framework in which an individual faces risks in both current and future periods. Models for insurance with and without the presence of endogenous saving are both discussed. In contrast to what most literature suggests, when decisions on...

We study a generalization of the classical monopoly insurance problem under adverse selection (see Stiglitz [1977]) where we allow for a random distribution of losses, possibly correlated with the agent’s risk parameter that is private information. Our model explains patterns of observed...

We measure the extent of consumption insurance to income shocks accounting for high-order moments of the income distribution. We derive a nonlinear consumption function, in which the extent of insurance varies with the sign and magnitude of income shocks. Using PSID data, we estimate an...