This paper discusses models of choice under imprecise objective probabilistic information featuring beliefs about beliefs -- second order beliefs. A new model, called Second Order Dual Expected Utility (SODEU) featuring non-additive second order beliefs is introduced, axiomatized and...

This paper discusses models of choice under imprecise objective probabilistic information featuring beliefs about beliefs -- second order beliefs. A new model, called Second Order Dual Expected Utility (SODEU) featuring non-additive second order beliefs is introduced, axiomatized and...

This paper discusses models of choice under imprecise objective probabilistic information featuring beliefs about beliefs -- second order beliefs. A new model, called Second Order Dual Expected Utility (SODEU) featuring non-additive second order beliefs is introduced, axiomatized and...

This paper proposes a class of weak additivity concepts for an operator on the set of real valued functions on a finite state space Ω, which include additivity and comonotonic additivity as extreme cases. Let E ⊆ 2Ω be a collection of subsets of Ω. Two functions x and y on Ω are...

We axiomatize a model of decision under objective ambiguity or imprecise risk. The decision maker forms a subjective (non necessarily additive) belief aboutthe likelihood of probability distributions and computes the average expected utility of a given act with respect to this second order...

This paper discusses models of choice under imprecise objective proba- bilistic information featuring beliefs about beliefs - second order beliefs. A new model, called Second Order Dual Expected Utility (SODEU) featuring non-additive second order beliefs is introduced, axiomatized and systemati-...

This paper proposes a class of weak additivity concepts for an operator on the set of real valued functions on a finite state space \omega, which include additivity and comonotonic additivity as extreme cases. Let \epsilon be a collection of subsets of \omega. Two functions x and y on \omega are...

Dow and Welang (1994) extended the notion of Nash equilibrium for two-player finite normal games when players are uncertainty on the behavior of his opponents. They showed the existence of equilibrium for any given degree of uncertainty however constant over all possible events, except the null...