One‐shot public‐good situations are prominent in the public debate, and a prime example for behavior diverging from the standard Nash‐equilibrium. Could a Nash‐equilibrium predict one‐shot public‐good behavior in principle? A “revealed‐preference Nash‐equilibrium” ( rpne )...

We introduce DOSE⸻Dynamically Optimized Sequential Experimentation⸻to elicit preference parameters. DOSE starts with a model of preferences and a prior over the parameters of that model, then dynamically chooses a customized question sequence for each participant according to an...

We introduce DOSE - Dynamically Optimized Sequential Experimentation - to elicit preference parameters. DOSE starts with a model of preferences and a prior over the parameters of that model, then dynamically chooses a customized question sequence for each participant according to an...

Most economic models assume that time preferences are stable over time, but the evidence on their long-term stability is lacking. We study whether and how time preferences change over the life cycle, exploiting representative long-term panel data. We provide new evidence that discount rates...

Previous work has shown that preferences are not always stable across time, but surprisingly little is known about the reasons for this instability. I examine whether variation in people's emotions over time predicts changes in risk attitudes. Using a large panel data set, I identify happiness,...

Previous work has shown that preferences are not always stable across time, but surprisingly little is known about the reasons for this instability. I examine whether variation in people's emotions over time predicts changes in risk attitudes. Using a large panel data set, I identify happiness,...

Most economic models assume that time preferences are stable over time, but the evidence on their long-term stability is lacking. We study whether and how time preferences change over the life cycle, exploiting representative long-term panel data. We provide new evidence that discount rates...