We consider a mean-field model of firms competing à la Cournot on a commodity market, where the commodity price is given in terms of a power inverse demand function of the industry-aggregate production. Investment is irreversible and production capacity depreciates at a constant rate....

We consider a mean-field model of firms competing à la Cournot on a commodity market, where the commodity price is given in terms of a power inverse demand function of the industry-aggregate production. Investment is irreversible and production capacity depreciates at a constant rate....

We consider non-cooperative bargaining on the division of a surplus under simple majority rule. We use the "open rule" bargaining protocol as originally suggested by Baron and Ferejohn (1989): Proposals can be amended before they are voted on. It is widely known that there are significant gaps...

We consider non-cooperative bargaining on the division of a surplus under simple majority rule. We use the "open rule" bargaining protocol as originally suggested by Baron and Ferejohn (1989): Proposals can be amended before they are voted on. It is widely known that there are significant gaps...

We introduce a computationally tractable dynamic equilibrium model of the automobile market where new and used cars of multiple types (e.g. makes/models) are traded by heterogeneous consumers. Prices and quantities are determined endogenously to equate supply and demand for all car types and...

We formally define Markov quantal response equilibrium (QRE) and prove existence for all finite discounted dynamic stochastic games. The special case of logit Markov QRE constitutes a mapping from precision parameter ... to sets of logit Markov QRE. The limiting points of this correspondence are...