In this paper, I explore the relationship between wage bargaining and capital accumulation by developing a differential game in which a monopolistic union sets the wage of its members by taking as given the optimal employment strategy of a representative firm and the way in which capital is...

We model and analyze employer cartels that fix wages by committing to a wage ceiling. The setting is a frictional labor market with large employers that compete for workers via posted wages. Wage fixing reduces competition both inside and outside the cartel, leading to market-wide wage...

This chapter reviews the theory of monopsonistic wage setting, its empirical implications, and some puzzles the framework has struggled to explain. We begin by examining the fundamentals of monopsonistic wage determination. The core of the theory is a mapping from the distribution of worker...

We develop a model of a frictional labor market with idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks, sticky wages, and two-sided lack of commitment between workers and firms. In this environment, wages are allocative in the sense that inefficient job separations arise when the wage-to-productivity ratio...