College graduates tend to marry each other. We use detailed Norwegian data to show that strong assortativity further arises by institution and field of study, especially among high earners from elite programs. Admission discontinuities reveal that enrollment itself, rather than selection,...

One of the main goals of two-sided matching mechanisms is to pair two groups of agents in a stable manner. Stability means that no pair of agents has an incentive to deviate from their assigned match. The outcome of such a match can have significant consequences for the participants involved....

Efficiency Adjusted Deferred Acceptance Rule (EDA) is a promising candidate mechanism for a public school assignment. A potential drawback of EDA is that it could encourage students to game the system since it is not strategy-proof. However, to successfully strategize, students typically need...

Social scientists have long been interested in marital homogamy and its relationship with inequality. However, measuring homogamy is not straightforward, particularly when one is interested in assessing marital sorting based on multiple traits. In this paper, we argue that Separate Extreme Value...

This paper presents the first quantitative meta-analysis of the price elasticity of charitable giving under both rebate and matching schemes. We compile 151 elasticity estimates from 33 experimental studies and synthesize them using random-effects and multi-level models. Charitable giving is...

We study the micro sources and macro consequences of worker–job matching across countries with large income differences. Using internationally comparable data on over 120,000 individuals in 30 countries, we document that workers' skills align more closely with their jobs' skill requirements in...