We investigate profit-share auctions in a procurement context,comparing them with traditional cash auctions to identify which mechanism yields lower expenses for buyers. We also explore whether specifying a high project value in profit-share auction contracts influences supplier bidding...

A common approach to markets with adverse selection is to regulate competition to minimize inefficiencies, while preserving consumer choice among firms. We study the role of procurement auctions - leading to sole provision by the winning firm - as an alternative market design. Relative to...

We investigate profit-share auctions in a procurement context, comparing them with traditional cash auctions to identify which mechanism yields lower expenses for buyers. We also explore whether specifying a high project value in profit-share auction contracts influences supplier bidding...

We develop a novel, scalable method for assessing the quality of public procurement systems using standard administrative data. Our approach compares the distribution of procurement opportunities to the distribution of contract awards across firms. We first derive a simple theoretical benchmark...