We investigate whether eponymous hedge funds-those named after their founder/manager-signal managerial ability or ethical behavior. While such funds do not outperform non-eponymous peers, they exhibit lower operational and fraud risks. Survey evidence supports these findings. Eponymous funds...

We examine how a CEO develops a reputation for credible financial reporting and how this reputation influences investor reactions to earnings announcements. We find that investors discount earnings news when CEOs have both strong incentives to misreport and weak reporting reputations. Further,...

This study explores how corporate reputation and regulation influence the quantity and quality of non-financial information (NFI) disclosure. While internal drivers of NFI reporting are well-studied, external pressures remain underexplored. Analyzing Ibex35 firms (2015-2019) during Spain's...

We develop a model of Ponzi schemes with asymmetric information to study Ponzi frauds. A long-lived agent offers to save on behalf of short-lived agents at a higher rate than they can earn themselves. The long-lived agent may genuinely have a superior savings technology, but may be an imposter...

This paper develops a simple model of sequel production for experience goods, showing how reputation shapes a producer's incentives. Producers differ in productivity, which determines how much effort they invest. A sequel is made only if the previous installment exceeds a quality threshold,...

We revisit the classic chain-store paradox by introducing a novel element: the arrival of exogenous, public signals about the incumbent's private type over time. As the horizon lengthens, two opposing forces come into play. On one hand, standard reputational incentives grow stronger; on the...