This article addresses conceptual shortcomings in recent literature on coalitional TU-games. We revisit and partly redefine key notions such as coalition, coalition function, efficiency, and duality, emphasizing their dependence on the class of TU-games under scrutiny. Unlike approaches that...

The well-known cooperative game solution core, with its strict stability requirement, provides no solution for non-balanced games. Subiza et al. (2025) relaxes the stability concept of the core and proposes δ-stable set, a non-empty solution for every essential TU-game. However, their approach...

Managing risk, matching resources efficiently, and ensuring fair allocation are fundamental challenges in both finance and decision-making processes. In many scenarios, participants contribute unequally to collective outcomes, raising the question of how to distribute costs, benefits, or...

We explore a broad class of values for cooperative games in characteristic function form, known as compromise values. These values efficiently allocate payoffs by linearly combining wellspecified upper and lower bounds on payoffs. We identify subclasses of games that admit nontrivial efficient...