We rationalize exclusive portfolio dealing in a novel three-period partial equilibrium framework populated by a representative, risk-neutral seller and a small number of ex ante identical broker-dealers. Endowed with independent, uncertain demand for a representative asset, the broker-dealers...

We investigate the effects of buyer heterogeneity in a market where an incumbent firm prevents entry when it signs enough exclusionary contracts with buyers. With heterogeneous buyers, several well-known results in exclusionary contracting with homogenous buyers are overturned and novel ones...

This study constructs a successive Cournot model to investigate the possibility that a separated upstream input supplier can solely sell the intermediate good to a separated downstream manufacturer through an exclusive contract in the presence of a vertically integrated rival. We find that the...

In this paper, we demonstrate that the anticompetitive effect of exclusive contractingon market entry can be completely nullified if the entrant is allowedto sell partial cross ownership (PCO) to the incumbent. In equilibrium theincumbent is fully compensated and efficient entry occurs; thus PCO...

This paper studies asymmetric platforms' incentives for enforcing exclusivity on multihoming sellers. We show that exclusivity benefits a platform only when its service is not very valuable to sellers, and hence can be initiated by a weak platform rather than the stronger one. It is possible for...

An incumbent supplier can use exclusive dealing contracts with buyers to prevent entry of an efficient rival when those contracts include an agreement over price. The linear price in the unique exclusionary equilibrium is above (below) the incumbent’s variable cost when buyers compete over...