We develop the theory of stability for aggregate matchings used in empirical studies and establish fundamental properties of stable matchings including the result that the set of stable matchings is a non-empty, complete, and distributive lattice. Aggregate matchings are relevant as matching...

We study a dynamic matching environment where individuals arrive sequentially. There is a tradeoff between waiting for a thicker market, allowing for higher-quality matches, and minimizing agents' waiting costs. The optimal mechanism cumulates a stock of incongruent pairs up to a threshold and...

We study the degree of falsifiability of theories of choice. A theory is easy to falsify if relatively small datasets are enough to guarantee that the theory can be falsified: the VC dimension of a theory is the largest sample size for which the theory is ''never falsifiable.'' VC dimension is...

We present an experimental study of decentralized two‐sided matching markets with no transfers. Experimental participants are informed of everyone's preferences and can make arbitrary nonbinding match offers that get finalized when a period of market inactivity has elapsed. Several insights...

Micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) are recognized as crucial drivers of economic development, particularly in low- and middle-income countries. The advent of digital platforms, characterized by economies of scale and significant cross-network externalities in two-sided markets,...