information in repeated games. We show that dynamically robust equilibria can be characterized using a one-shot robustness … equilibrium values in the repeated prisoners' dilemma. We show that robustness requirements have sharp intuitive implications …

This paper considers an infinitely repeated three-player Bayesian game with lack of information on two sides, in which … generalization of Aumann, Maschler and Stearns (1995) two-player zero-sum one-sided incomplete information model. Under a correlated … prior, the informed player faces the problem of how to optimally disclose information among two uninformed players in order …

agreements.To derive our main results we apply the Folk Theorem to the river sharing problem using the equilibrium concepts of … subgame-perfect equilibrium and renegotiation-proof equilibrium. We show that, given the upstream-downstream asymmetry …

value for which the players obtain all the feasible and individually rational payoffs as equilibrium payoffs. We show that … affect dramatically the equilibrium payoffs. …