States write incomplete contracts when negotiating and concluding international treaties. Often, they delegate the interpretation of treaties to third-party adjudicators. Some treaties, especially in environmental law, do not institutionalize adjudication within the treaty regime but leave the...

Economics is not only a subject matter but also a specific methodological approach. Economic analysis in International Economic Law is therefore not confined to economic matters but can be extended to virtually all issues by drawing on the economic approach. It can be used both to explain the...

Traditionally, the enforcement of public international law (PIL) was a task of states: its addressees and its enforcers were states. That has changed recently. Whereas the influence of private market actors on the making of PIL has been extensively analyzed, their influence on its enforcement...

Nudges having paternalistic purposes (paternalistic nudges) pose special legal problems in liberal States. Surprisingly, the discussion on regulation-by-nudging has not focused on the constitutional limits to nudging. Although the property rights of firms potentially infringed by nudging...

This comment on Alan Sykes Article "Economic 'Necessity' in International Law" on AJIL UNBOUND discusses the application of necessity clauses from an economic perspective especially in light of the incentives of investors, who are the third party beneficiaries of the investment treaty/contract....

International Investment Law (IIL), like international trade law, has an economic rationale as its background. Nevertheless, this economic rationale and the empirical insights into assumed causal links play a much smaller role than in trade law. Whereas in trade law economic insights have found...

Die Dissertation setzt sich mit der Frage auseinander, unter welchen Bedingungen die Reputation von Unternehmen einen Verhaltensanreiz für diese darstellt und als Sanktionsinstrument genutzt werden kann

It is hypothesized that prosecution agencies that are dependent on the executive have less incentives to prosecute crimes committed by government members which, in turn, increases their incentives to commit such crimes. Here, this hypothesis is put to an empirical test focusing on a particular...