We incorporate structural modellers into the economy they model. Using the traditional moment-matching method, they ignore policy feedback and estimate parameters using a structural model that treats policy changes as zero probability (or exogenous) "counterfactuals." Estimation bias occurs...

Causal evidence from random assignment has been labeled "the most credible." We argue itis generally incomplete in finance/economics, omitting central parts of the true empirical causalchain. Random assignment, in eliminating self-selection, simultaneously precludes signaling viatreatment...

Random assignment is insufficient for measured treatment responses to recover causal effects (comparative statics) in dynamic economies. We characterize analytically bias probabilities and magnitudes. If the policy variable is binary there is attenuation bias. With more than two policy states,...

Absent theoretical guidance, empiricists have been forced to rely upon numerical comparative statics from constant tax rate models in formulating testable implications of tradeoff theory in the context of natural experiments. We fill the theoretical void by solving in closed-form a dynamic...

We develop a rational expectations model of placebo effects. If subjects in seemingly-ideal single-stage RCTs form rational beliefs about breakthroughs based upon personal physiological responses, mental effects differ across medications received, treatment versus control. Consequently, the...

We determine optimal security design and retention of asset-backed securities by a privately informed issuer with positive NPV uses for immediate cash. In canonical models, investors revert to prior beliefs if issuers pool at zero-retentions (originate-to-distribute), and separating equilibria...

What determines equilibrium securitization levels, and should they be regulated? To address these questions we develop a model where originators can exert unobservable effort to increase asset quality, subsequently having private information regarding quality when selling ABS to rational...

This paper shows that dominant firms may wish to encourage competition in vertically-related markets. It shows that firms' incentives to vertically integrate other firms depends on the competitive environment.

We demonstrate constraints on usage of direct revelation mechanisms (DRMs) by corporations inhabiting economies with securities markets. We consider a corporation seeking to acquire decision relevant information. Posting a standard DRM in an environment with a securities market endogenously...