We investigate the problem of subsidising afforestation when private information exists with respect to the level of private utility derived from the project. We develop a simple model that allows for an intelligent design of contracts when information is asymmetric. The model involves the...

Two important aspects of global environmental problems are that (1) the actions of past generations affect the opportunities of the present, and (2) both in the past and the present generations, collaboration across different countries is needed to provide global public goods. In this paper, we...

We investigate the problem of subsidising afforestation when private information exists with respect to the level of private utility derived from the project. We develop a simple model that allows for an intelligent design of contracts when information is asymmetric. The model involves the...

We investigate a bureaucratic principal responsible for the procurement of goods and services from private agents. The bureaucrat is evaluated on output and controlled by a limited budget. The agents maximize profit, have private information about variable production costs, and have positive...

This paper considers optimal investment behaviour when investment options evolve deterministically or stochastically over time and investments are irreversible and indivisible. It extends the standard investment-under-uncertainty set-up with a single investment option to the case of repeated...

A dynamic model of agricultural household behaviour in less developed countries in the presence of credit constraints and income uncertainty is developed. The production side of the model takes into account the irreversible and indivisible nature of non-stationary agricultural investment...

In general most nature-based recreational goods and benefits are considered positive externalities of production, as they are usually not subject to trade. So far, a low degree of rivalry among most user groups and legally defined rights has secured these benefits as almost a public good. Yet,...

We investigate the problem of subsidising afforestation when private information exists with respect to the level of private utility derived from the project. We develop a simple model that allows for an intelligent design of contracts when information is asymmetric. The model involves the...