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We study the formation of mutual funds by generalizing the standard competitive noisy rational expectations framework. In our model, informed agents set up mutual funds as a means of selling their private information to uninformed agents. We study the case of imperfect competition among fund...
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This article studies equilibrium asset pricing when agents face nonnegative wealth constraints. In the presence of these constraints it is shown that options on the market portfolio are nonredundant securities and the economy's pricing kernel is a function of both the market portfolio and the...
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Corporate insiders holding derivative contracts on their firm's stock have an incentive to engage in stock price manipulation. I examine several derivative contracts susceptible to manipulation and the price impact of the insiders' strategic behavior. Digital contracts, the basic building blocks...
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Microstructure researchers have long understood that information quality has an effect on price formation in the underlying asset market. However, option researchers have largely ignored the fact that information quality might also impact the options market. This article characterizes the nature...
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This article shows how the market coskewness model of Rubinstein (1973) and Kraus and Litzenberger (1976) is altered when a nonredundant call option is optimally traded. Owing to the option's nonredundancy, the economy's stochastic discount factor (SDF) depends not only on the market return and...
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This paper considers an optimal contracting problem between an informed risk-averse agent and a principal, when the agent needs to perform multiple tasks, and the principal is active, namely she can influence some aspect of the agency relationship on top of the contract itself (i.e. capital...
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