The authors develop a model of electoral competition in which citizens choose whether or not to run as candidates. A winner implements her favorite policy. The equilibrium number of candidates depends negatively on the cost of running and positively on the benefits of winning. For some parameter...

A model of a collusive duopoly in which each firm has limited capacity is studied. The negotiated output quotas depend on the bargaining power of the firms, which derives from the damage the firms can do by cutting prices. For fixed capacities, the unit profit of the small firm is at least as...

The authors study interactive situations in which players are boundedly rational. Each player, rather than optimizing given a belief about the other players' behavior, as in the theory of Nash equilibrium, uses the following choice procedure. She first associates one consequence with each of her...

A partly analytical, partly computational approach is used to study mixed strategy equilibria of Hotelling's model of sp atial competition in which each of two firms chooses a location in a line segment and a price. There is a unique (up to symmetry) subgame perfect equilibrium in which the...

We present a complete, separable and metrizable topology on the product space of information and (subjective) beliefs. Such a topology formalizes similarity of differential information without the assumption of a common prior, but under the assumption that objectively impossible events are...

In a setting where agents have quasi-linear utilities over social alternatives and a transferable commodity, we consider three properties that a social choice function may possess: truthful implementation (in dominant strategies); monotonicity in differences; and lexicographic affine...