The capacity to sustain policies over time and the capacity to adjust policies in the face of changing circumstances are two desirable properties of policymaking systems. Veto player theory, a very influential approach in comparative politics, has suggested that polities with more veto players...

This paper contributes to an agenda that views the effects of federalism and decentralization as dependent on the incentives of national and subnational political actors. It studies the mechanisms by which subnational actors affect decisions at the central level, in the context of a highly...

This paper links the theory of interest groups influence over the legislature with that of congressional control over the judiciary. The resulting framework reconciles the theoretical literature of lobbying with the negative available evidence on the impact of lobbying over legislative outcomes,...

We show that standard principal-agent results are not robust to the introduction of additional contracting opportunities for the agent. We analyze extended games including additional players who might trade risk away from the agent. For some settings and parameter values, the principal is worse...

Substantial policy changes, like market-oriented reforms by populist parties and steps towards peace by 'hawks,' are sometimes implemented by 'unlikely' parties. To account for such episodes, this paper develops a framework in which incumbent politicians have better information about the state...

Real price variability depreciates the information about future prices contained in current ones. Repeat-purchase customers have, then, less incentive to acquire price information. The fact that consumers are less well informed allows firms to increase their markups and permits inefficient...