In this paper we analyze cartel formation and self-reporting incentives when firms operate in several geographical markets and face antitrust enforcement in different jurisdictions. We are concerned with the effectiveness of leniency programs and the benefits of international antitrust...

Self-reporting schemes have become a substantial part of law enforcement. This paper analyzes the optimal use of such schemes when the authority cannot commit to an ex post investigation effort. I show that this leads to a negative relationship between self-reporting incentives and investigation...

This paper analyzes the role of communication between firms in an infinitely repeated Bertrand game in which firms receive private signals of a common value i.i.d. demand shock. It is shown that firms can use stochastic, inter-temporal market sharing as a substitute for communication in low...

We investigate the interplay between firms' R&D decisions and local labor market competition and how this influences equilibrium location choices and welfare. Firms engage in risky R&D activities that generate stochastic product and derived labor demand. We show that firms located in a cluster...