We analyze horizontal mergers in a collusive environment by using an infinitely repeated game where (i) a subset of collusive firms is exogenously given and (ii) partially collusive arrangements are allowed for. We show that, in our model, there is no clear relation between the existence of...

We analyze risk taking behavior of banks in the context of spatial competition. Banks mobilize unsecured deposits by offering deposit rates, which they invest either in a prudent or a gambling asset. Limited liability along with high return of a successful gamble induce moral hazard at the bank...

type="main" <title type="main">ABSTRACT</title> <p>We discuss the effects of the existence of non-colluding (fringe) firms on cartel sustainability. We obtain, using trigger strategies, that with product differentiation collusion is always more easily sustained when firms compete in prices than when firms compete in...</p>

This paper considers a theoretical model of n asymmetric firms that reduce their initial unit costs by spending on R&D activities. In accordance with the Schumpeterian hypotheses, more efficient (bigger) firms spend more on R&D and this leads to a more concentrated market structure. This calls...