This paper studies a dynamic Markovian game of two infinitely-lived altruistic agents without commitment. Players can save, consume and give transfers to each other. We identify a continuum of equilibria in which imperfectly-altruistic agents act as if they were a perfectly-altruistic dynasty...

I study a vintage-human-capital model in which long-lived workers accumulate human capital following an exogenous learning curve. Different skill levels inside a vintage are complementary in production; this makes the ex ante homogeneous workers enter different vintages. The continuous-time...

I introduce endogenous human-capital accumulation into an infinite-horizon version of Chari and Hopenhaynʼs (1991) [4] vintage-human-capital model. Returns to skill and tenure premia are highest in young vintages, where skill is scarcest and agents accumulate human capital fastest. As the...