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Say Pays! Shareholder Voice and Firm Performance

Cuñat, Vicente; Giné, Mireia; Guadalupe, Maria - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014

This paper estimates the effects of Say-on-Pay (SoP); a policy that increases shareholder "voice" by providing shareholders with a regular vote on executive pay. We apply a regression discontinuity design to the votes on shareholder-sponsored SoP proposals. Adopting SoP leads to large increases...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084697

Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem

Bebchuk, Lucian Arye; Fried, Jesse - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

produce weak or even perverse incentives. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662270

Executive Compensation in America: Optimal Contracting or Extraction of Rents

Bebchuk, Lucian Arye; Fried, Jesse; Walker, David I - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001

This Paper develops an account of the role and significance of rent extraction in executive compensation. Under the optimal contracting view of executive compensation, which has dominated academic research on the subject, pay arrangements are set by a board of directors that aims to maximize...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123963

Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation

Bebchuk, Lucian Arye; Fried, Jesse; Walker, David I - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

rent extraction might lead to the use of inefficient pay arrangements that provide suboptimal incentives and thereby hurt …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114260

Fire the Manager to Improve Performance? Managerial Turnover and Incentives After Privatization in the Czech Republic

Fidrmuc, Jan; Fidrmuc, Jana - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

This Paper analyses the effect of the introduction of managerial incentives and new human capital on enterprise … performance after privatization in the Czech Republic. We find weak evidence for the presence of managerial incentives: only in … indicates that the privatized firms operate below potential under the incumbent management. We show that the institutional …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792419

Rhineland exit?

Bovenberg, A Lans; Teulings, Coen N - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

insiders on the surplus of the firm is damaging. The transition from the Rhineland model (in which management serves the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504292

The Internal Governance of Firms

Acharya, Viral V; Myers, Stewart C; Rajan, Raghuram G - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

We develop a model of internal governance where the self-serving actions of top management are limited by the potential …, even without any external governance. Internal governance seems to work best when both top management and subordinates are …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004980207

Good Monitoring, Bad Monitoring

Grinstein, Yaniv; Rossi, Stefano - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014

Are courts effective monitors of corporate decisions? In a controversial landmark case, the Delaware Supreme Court held directors personally liable for breaching their fiduciary duties, signaling a sharp increase in Delaware’s scrutiny over corporate decisions. In our event study, low-growth...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084098

Do Entrenched Managers Pay Their Workers More?

Cronqvist, Henrik; Heyman, Fredrik; Nilsson, Mattias; … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

workers’ pay. CEOs with more control pay their workers more, but financial incentives through ownership of cash flow rights …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005067445

Outside Finance, Dominant Investors and Strategic Transparency

Perotti, Enrico C; von Thadden, Ernst-Ludwig - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001

This Paper studies the incentives for transparency under different forms of corporate governance in a context of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005656269