prizes and punish low performance agents with negative prizes. We link the optimal prize structure to the curvature of …

We study all-pay auctions with multiple prizes. The players have the same value for all the certain prizes except for … the number of prizes is smaller than the number of players, independent of the ranking of the uncertain prize, a player … players' ex-ante expected utility as well the players' expected total effort. Also, increasing the number of prizes may …

We study all-pay contests under incomplete information where the reward is a function of the contestant's type and …

We study all-pay contests in which there is a positive probability of a tied outcome. We analyse both one …-stage contests and multi-stage contests with tie-breaks. We demonstrate that in symmetric two-player contests, the designer does not … have an incentive to award a prize in a case of a tie. Consequently, in symmetric multi-stage two-player contests, the …

We study two-stage all-pay auctions with two identical prizes. In each stage, players compete for one prize. Each … player may win either one or two prizes. We analyze the equilibrium strategies where players' marginal values for the prizes …

We study a sequential two-stage all-pay auction with two identical prizes. In each stage, the players compete for one … prize and each player may win either one or two prizes. The designer may impose a cap on the players' bids in each of the …

We study two-stage political contests with private entry costs. We show that these political contests could be …