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Optimal Ownership of Public Goods Reconsidered

Schmitz, Patrick W - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014

Consider a non-governmental organization (NGO) that can invest in a public good. Should the government or the NGO own …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084400

Incomplete contracts and optimal ownership of public goods

Schmitz, Patrick W - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

The government and a non-governmental organization (NGO) can invest in the provision of a public good. In an incomplete … bargaining powers such that either ownership by the government or by the NGO can be optimal. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083497

Investments in physical capital, relationship-specificity, and the property rights approach

Schmitz, Patrick W - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013

We reconsider the property rights approach to the theory of the firm based on incomplete contracts. We explore the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083975

Bargaining position, bargaining power, and the property rights approach

Schmitz, Patrick W - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013

In the property rights approach to the theory of the firm (Hart, 1995), parties bargain about whether or not to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084329

Control Rights in Public-Private Partnerships

Francesconi, Marco; Muthoo, Abhinay - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

This paper develops a theory of the allocation of authority between two parties that produce impure public goods. We … show that the optimal allocation depends on technological factors, the parties' valuations of the goods produced, and the … degree of impurity of these goods. When the degree of impurity is large, control rights should be given to the main investor …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792544

Public goods and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information

Schmitz, Patrick W - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

An agent can make an observable but non-contractible investment. A principal then offers to collaborate with the agent to provide a public good. Private information of the agent about his valuation may either decrease or increase his investment incentives, depending on whether he learns his type...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084108

A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation

Fehr, Ernst; Schmidt, Klaus M. - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1998

There is strong evidence that people exploit their bargaining power in competitive markets but not in bilateral bargaining situations. There is also strong evidence that people exploit free-riding opportunities in voluntary cooperation games. Yet, when they are given the opportunity to punish...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504682

Incomplete Contracting, Renegotiation, and Expectation-Based Loss Aversion

Herweg, Fabian; Karle, Heiko; Muller, Daniel - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014

, a good of too high quality or too low quality is traded ex post. Based on the buyer's expectation management, our theory …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083642

Anti-Social Behavior in Profit and Nonprofit Organizations

Auriol, Emmanuelle; Brilon, Stefanie - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

Two types of intrinsically motivated workers are considered: "good" workers care about the mission of an organization, whereas "bad" workers derive pleasure from destructive behavior. While missionoriented organizations take advantage of the intrinsic motivation of good workers, they are more...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083802

Competition and Incentives with Motivated Agents

Besley, Timothy J.; Ghatak, Maitreesh - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

A unifying theme in the literature on organizations such as public bureaucracies and private non-profits is the importance of missions, as opposed to profit, as an organizational goal. Such mission-oriented organizations are frequently staffed by motivated agents who subscribe to the mission....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791396