This paper first discusses how the market is delineated in some recent antitrust cases in the printed media industry. It evaluates the extent to which the main features of the industry are incorporated into the analysis and affect market definition. In addition we argue that an econometric...

This paper introduces three methodological advances to study the optimal design of static and dynamic markets. First, we apply a mechanism design approach to characterize all incentive-compatible market equilibria. Second, we conduct a normative analysis, i.e. we evaluate alternative competition...

This paper provides a critical review of competition policy in Switzerland. We analyse the legal statute, the institutional arrangements for its implementation and the case law since 1985. We find that the Cartel Commission, which was given wide discretion by the law, has been relatively immune...

Motivated by the general lack of empirical scholarship concerning the cross-national environment for competition policy, I present measures here of the overall resources dedicated to competition policy and the merger policy work-load for thirty-two antitrust jurisdictions over the 1992-2007...

Modern economies predominantly rely on the working of markets. To ensure that markets are a level playing field for economic agents, competition policies are usually included in the legal framework that regulates economic activities. Portugal is no exception to this rule. This paper reviews the...

Market definition for antitrust purposes is by now firmly rooted in economic analysis both in the US and the EU, even if the approaches are slightly different. This Paper examines the theoretical basis for the legal definitions and assesses whether the general principles need to be adapted when...

We extend the literature on exclusive dealing by allowing the incumbent and the potential entrant to merge. This uncovers new effects. First, exclusive deals can be used to improve the incumbent’s bargaining position in the merger negotiation. Second, the incumbent finds it easier to elicit...

An antitrust authority deters collusion using fines and a leniency program. Unlike in most of the earlier literature, our firms have imperfect cumulative evidence of the collusion. That is, cartel conviction is not automatic if one firm reports: reporting makes conviction only more likely, the...

In most jurisdictions, antitrust fines are based on affected commerce rather than on collusive profits, and in some others, caps on fines are introduced based on total firm sales rather than on affected commerce. We uncover a number of distortions that these policies generate, propose simple...