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Entrepreneurial Entry: Which Institutions Matter?

Aidis, Ruta; Estrin, Saul; Mickiewicz, Tomasz - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

In this paper we explore the relationship between the individual decision to become an entrepreneur and the institutional context. We pinpoint the critical roles of property rights and the size of the state sector for entrepreneurial activity and test the relationships empirically by combining...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792210

The Determinants of Asset Stripping: Theory and Evidence from the Transition Economies

Campos, Nauro F; Giovannoni, Francesco - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

model, measure and investigate this process empirically. This paper tries to fill this gap by putting forward theory and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504218

Law Enforcement and Transition

Roland, Gérard; Verdier, Thierry - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2000

We present a simple model to analyse law enforcement problems in transition economies. Law enforcement implies coordination problems and multiplicity of equilibria due to a law abidance and a fiscal externality. We analyse two institutional mechanisms for solving the coordination problem. A...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504479

Overdeterrence of repeat offenders when penalties for first-time offenders are restricted

Muller, Daniel; Schmitz, Patrick W - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014

When penalties for first-time offenders are restricted, it is typically optimal for the lawmaker to overdeter repeat offenders. First-time offenders are then deterred not only by the (restricted) fine for a first offense, but also by the prospect of a large fine for a subsequent offense. Now...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083501

Legalizing Bribe Giving

Dufwenberg, Martin; Spagnolo, Giancarlo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

A model of harassment bribes (paid for services one is entitled to) is developed and used to analyze the recent proposal to legalize paying bribes while increasing fines on accepting bribes. We explore performance as regards corruption deterrence and public service provision. A modified scheme,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083969

Leniency Policies and Illegal Transactions

Buccirossi, Paolo; Spagnolo, Giancarlo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

We study the consequences of leniency - reduced legal sanctions for wrongdoers who spontaneously self-report to law enforcers - on sequential, bilateral, illegal transactions such as corruption, manager-auditor collusion, or drug deals. It is known that leniency helps to deter illegal...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124229

Optimal Fines in the Era of Whistleblowers

Buccirossi, Paolo; Spagnolo, Giancarlo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

We review current methods for calculating fines against cartels in the US and EU, and simulate their deterrence effects under different assumptions on the legal and economic environment. It is likely that European fines have not had significant deterrence effects before leniency programs were...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136460

Individual Protection Against Property Crime: Decomposing the Effects of Protection Observability

Hotte, Louis; van Ypersele, Tanguy - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

We revisit the question of the efficiency of individual decisions to be protected against crime for the cases of both …. A decrease in the global crime payoff is detrimental to a victim if protection is observable, while it is beneficial …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504304

Racial Beliefs, Location And The Causes Of Crime

Verdier, Thierry; Zenou, Yves - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2000

market outcomes reinforce each other to imply high crime rates among blacks living in cities. This is referred to as the … experience the same labour market and crime outcomes and live together. This is referred to as the non-discriminating equilibrium … of crime is greater. Consequently, if there were no spatial dimension in this economy so that all workers were residing …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504648

Property Crime with Private Protection: A Market-for-Offenses Approach

Hotte, Louis; Valognes, Fabrice; van Ypersele, Tanguy - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

We propose a market-for-offenses model of property crime, which explicitly accounts for protection expenditures among … heterogeneous individuals. The crime equilibrium is modeled as a free-access equilibrium in which the match between criminals and … victims equates the average returns to crime. We borrow from the literature on the economics of conflicts in order to define …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504660