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Optimal Contracting Of New Experience Goods

Deb, Rahul - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2008

We model new experience goods in the context of dynamic mechanism design. These are goods for which an agent is unsure of her valuation but can learn it through consumption experience. We consider a dynamic environment with a single buyer and seller in which contracting occurs over T periods,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005619380

A note on the Exclusion Principle

Bertoletti, Paolo - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2006

According to the so-called Exclusion Principle (introduced by Baye et alii, 1993), it might be profitable for the seller to reduce the number of fully-informed potential bidders in an all-pay auction. We show that it does not apply if the seller regards the bidders’ private valuations as...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005621370

A note on reserve price commitments in the Vickrey auction

Glowicka, Ela; Beck, Jonathan - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2006

This note provides a simple explanation why sellers rarely set optimal reserve prices in one-shot auctions. In a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005621705

Analyse de l'impact des coûts de participation sur la stratégie des enchérisseurs dans les Prises de contrôle

Burkart, Mike - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2009

We consider a takeover in which risk neutral bidders must incur participation costs and study their optimal strategy. We found that bidders decision of participation is endogenous. There is a threshold of private participation cost above that a potential bidder will stay out of takeover process....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009004201

On the Existence of Price Equilibrium in Economies with Excess Demand Functions

Tian, Guoqiang - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2010

This paper provides a price equilibrium existence theorem in economies where commodities may be indivisible and aggregate excess demand functions may be discontinuous. We introduce a very weak notion of continuity, called recursive transfer lower semi-continuity, which is weaker than transfer...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011109908

Second-price Auction with Two-Dimensional Private Information on Values and Participation Costs

Cao, Xiaoyong; Tian, Guoqiang - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2007

This paper studies equilibria of second price auctions when values and participation costs are both privation …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011112898

Equilibria in Second Price Auctions with Information Acquisition

Li, Shengyu; Tian, Guoqiang - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2008

This paper studies equilibria in second price auctions with information acquisition in an independent private value …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011113746

Procurement Auctions with Renegotiation and Wealth Constraints

Chang, Wei-Shiun; Salmon, Timothy C.; Saral, Krista Jabs - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2013

Renegotiation is a common practice in procurement auctions which allows for post-auction price adjustments and is …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011113750

Loss Aversion in Sequential Auctions: Endogenous Interdependence, Informational Externalities and the "Afternoon Effect"

Rosato, Antonio - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2014

Empirical evidence from sequential auctions shows that prices of identical goods tend to decline between rounds. In …. I analyze two-round sealed-bid auctions with symmetric bidders having independent private values and unit demand … next-round price so that equilibrium prices decline. Moreover, sequential and simultaneous auctions are not bidder …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011114448

Sequential bargaining with pure common values

Schweinzer, Paul - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2006

We study the alternating-offers bargaining problem of assigning an indivisible and commonly valued object to one of two players in return for some payment among players. The players are asymmetrically informed about the objectâ€™s value and have veto power over any settlement. There is no...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005785835