Over the past two decades, Nigeria has not reaped fully the benefits of its national wealth despite its efforts at structural adjustment. This paper concludes that the facts do not justify the negative image that structural adjustment has had in Nigeria. Vigorous market reforms and tight...

As a companion piece to the Board paper on Structural Reforms and Macroeconomic Performance: Initial Considerations for the Fund, this paper presents a selection of case studies on the structural reform experiences of member countries. These papers update the Board on work since the Triennial...

For over 10 years, the IMF has supported adjustment and reform programs in many of its low-income members through two facilities established specifically for that purpose - the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) and its precursor the Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF). By the end...

The art of financial programming is a central element in the design of IMF-supported macroeconomic adjustment programs. This volume, edited by Richard Barth and William Hemphill, includes contributions from staff members of the IMF institute and introduces the reader to the concepts and tools of...

The paper provides an overview of the main elements of pay systems that are typically used to remunerate government employees and, with reference to the experience of developed and developing countries, discusses structural issues frequently arising in the formulation of government pay policies:...

This paper develops a small analytical model to explore the relationship between the dynamics of macroeconomic adjustment and the timing of the implementation of an adjustment program featuring a nominal devaluation. The effects of postponing adjustment depend on the source of the original...

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the argument that debt relief would increase the incentive of a debtor country to make an adjustment effort (to invest) and that for this reason creditors may benefit by granting relief. It is shown that there are actually opposing incentive effects of...