Similar Search Results

Multimarket Linkages, Cartel Discipline and Trade Costs

Agnosteva, Delina - 2018

We build a model of tacit collusion between firms that operate in multiple markets to study the effects of trade costs …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012926563

Multi-Market Collusion with Demand Linkages and Antitrust Enforcement

Choi, Jay Pil - 2009

This paper analyzes dynamic cartel formation and antitrust enforcement when firms operate in demand-related markets. We show that cartel prosecution can have a knock-on effect: desisting a cartel in one market reduces profits and cartel stability and leads to the break-up of the cartel in the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013160219

Fighting Collusion by Permitting Price Discrimination

Helfrich, Magdalena - 2016

We investigate the effect of a ban on third-degree price discrimination on the sustainability of collusion. We build a …' discount factor has to be higher in order to sustain collusion in grim-trigger strategies under price discrimination than under …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012996205

Global Cartels, Leniency Programs and International Antitrust Cooperation

Choi, Jay Pil - 2010

In this paper we analyze cartel formation and self-reporting incentives when firms operate in several geographical markets and face antitrust enforcement in different jurisdictions. We are concerned with the effectiveness of leniency programs and the benefits of international antitrust...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013144908

Policy Innovations, Political Preferences, and Cartel Prosecutions

Ghosal, Vivek - 2015

, collusion …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013012564

Merger Without Cost Advantages

Huck, Steffen; Konrad, Kai A.; Müller, Wieland - 2021

The seminal paper by Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (1983) showed that merger in a standard Cournot framework with linear demand and linear costs is not profitable unless a large majority of the firms are involved in the merger. However, many strategic aspects matter for firm competition such as...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013318548

International Antitrust Enforcement and Multi-Market Contact

Choi, Jay Pil; Gerlach, Heiko - CESifo - 2009

antitrust authorities in each market. We are concerned with how the sustainability of collusion in one local market is affected … collusion sustainability across markets leads to potential externalities in antitrust enforcement across jurisdictions. As a … by the existence of collusion in other markets when they are linked by demand relationships. The interdependence of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005051554

Vertical Integration and Downstream Collusion

Biancini, Sara - 2016

stakes of collusion. On the other hand, it creates an asymmetry between the integrated firm and the unintegrated competitors … cooperative equilibrium, which potentially harms collusion. As we show, the optimal collusive profit-sharing agreement takes care … the asymmetries in the non cooperative state. As a result, vertical integration generally favors collusion …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012987391

Optimal Cross-Licensing Arrangements : Collusion Versus Entry Deterrence

Choi, Jay Pil - 2018

This paper analyzes optimal cross-licensing arrangements between incumbent firms in the presence of potential entrants. The optimal cross-licensing royalty rate trades off incentives to sustain a collusive outcome vis-a-vis incentives to deter entry with the threat of patent litigation. We show...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012912373

Multi-Market Collusion with Demand Linkages and Antitrust Enforcement

Choi, Jay Pil; Gerlach, Heiko - CESifo - 2009

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005000368