We present an analysis of how political factors may come into play in the equilibrium determination of inflation. We employ a standard overlapping generations model with heterogenous young-age endowments, and a government that funds an exogenous spending via a combination of non-distortionary...

In this study some of the consequences of an uncertain policy struggle ("game of chicken") between independent taxing agencies (a monetary and a fiscal authority) are examined. We show that policy uncertainty may improve upon regimes where there is no uncertainty and one agency succeeds in...

Does monetizing a deficit always result in a higher rate of inflation than bond financing the same deficit? T. J. Sargent and N. Wallace (1981) produced conditions under which the answer was negative ('unpleasant monetarist arithmetic'). Subsequent authors have challenged the empirical validity...

In this paper we assume away standard distributional and staticefficiency arguments for public health and instead seek a dynamic efficiency rationale. We study a lifecycle model wherein young agents make health investments to reduce mortality risk. We identify a welfare rationale for public...

In this paper we reconsider the link between tight money policies and inflation in the spirit of Sargent and Wallace's (1981) influential paper, "Some unpleasant monetarist arithmetic." A standard neoclassical model with capital, bonds, and return-dominated currency is used. The potential for...