We introduce a theory on marginal values and their core stability for cooperative games with arbitrary coalition structure. The theory is based on the notion of nested sets and the complex of nested sets associated to an arbitrary set system and the M-extension of a game for this set. For a set...

In this paper we introduce the concept of quasi-building set that may underlie the coalitional structure of a cooperative game with restricted communication between the players. Each feasible coalition, including the set of all players, contains a nonempty subset called the choice set of the...

A cooperative game with non-transferable utility (NTU-game) consists of a collection of payoff sets for the subsets of a finite set of players, for which it has to be determined how much payoff each player must receive. The core of an NTU-game consists of all payoff vectors that are in the...

A general equilibrium model is considered with multiple divisible and multiple indivisible commodities. In models with indivisibles it is always assumed that an indivisible commodity, called money, is present that is used to transfer the value of certain amounts of indivisible goods. For these...